OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
CONDUCT
OF
GREAT-BRITAIN,
In Reſpect to
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IN WHICH

All the OBJECTIONS that have been thrown out in ſome late PAMPHLETS and DISCOURSES are fairly anſwered, and the MEASURES of the PRESENT MINISTRY fully Vindicated.

LONDON:
Printed for T. COOPER, at the *Globe* in *Pater-Noſter-Row.* 1742.
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GREAT-BRITAIN,

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In a LETTER to a FRIEND,

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THE CONDUCT OF GREAT-BRITAIN, In Respect to FOREIGN AFFAIRS, &c.

IT has been sometimes thought a Point that would admit of Dispute, whether, considering our Situation as an Island, we ought to take any great Share in the Affairs of the Continent or not. It is no difficult Matter for Men of great Parts, and who are well vers'd in political Learning, to give a Colour of Reason to any Opinion whatsoever, and consequently both Sides of this Question may be maintained, by such plausible Arguments as to hinder our distinguishing with Certainty on which the Truth lies. But if we call in Experience to our Assistance, and consider with ourselves which of our Princes have made the greatest Figure, those who attended to, or those who neglected foreign Affairs, we shall

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be no longer in the dark, but on the contrary be able to pronounce, and on good Evidence, about a proper Regard to Things abroad as the surest Method of making Affairs go right at home.

To ascend no higher in our History than the Reign of *Henry* VIII. his Maxim was, That, as King of *England*, it was both his Interest and his Right to hold the Balance of Power in *Europe*; and he was so willing this Maxim should be known, that, at a Congress abroad, he caused an Archer to be embroider'd on his Tent, with this Motto, *The Side I take shall prevail.* He had frequent Opportunities of making good this Declaration, by changing Sides, as the Possession of Power varied, and he did it so dexterously through the greatest Part of his Reign, that he was equally revered by Foreigners, and admired by his own Subjects. I do not pretend to apologize for, or even to enter into the Measures he pursued at home; for whether they were right or wrong, it will equally serve my Purpose, since all our Historians agree it was the Figure he made abroad enabled him to carry Things so successfully in his own Kingdoms, and notwithstanding so turbulent a Reign to die in full Possession of the Affections of his People.

Under his Son and Successor *Edward* VI. the Duke of *Somerset*, Protector of his Person, and of his Dominions, lost himself by his pusillanimous Behaviour. He was afraid of disobliging foreign Powers during a Minority, and especially after he found himself distressed by Factions at home; and this Disposition, instead of strengthening him against, laid him open to the Intrigues of his domestick Enemies, who, by insulting on his Want of Conduct in

in this respect, destroyed the Reputation he had deservedly acquired by his Care of Religion, and his Tenderness for the People. His Successor in the Administration, the great Duke of *Northumberland* lost himself the same Way; he was too attentive to the Concerns of his own Family, and had too little Regard to the Credit of the Nation abroad, which encouraged the *French* to incroach on our Possessions upon the Continent, and to plunder our Merchants, which made this great Duke universally odious to his Countrymen, and pav'd the Way to his Destruction in the next Reign.

The Government of Queen *Mary*, harsh and rigorous as it was, grew more and more established, while she acted a consistent Part with respect to foreign Affairs; but when, in consequence of her Marriage with *Philip* II. she engaged in a rash War with *France*, and sacrificed the Interest of her own Kingdom, as well as the Care she ought to have had of the Balance of Power in *Europe*, to her private Inclinations, all things went wrong. Her Subjects grew uneasy, her Parliaments censured her Measures; her Ministers lost their Authority, and the falling of *Calais* into the Hands of the *French*, broke her Heart, and ruined all her Designs.

Queen *Elizabeth*, from her very Accession to the Throne, discovered a right Judgment in this respect; she found the Kingdom in a lower and more distressed Condition than it had ever been, and yet she had the Courage to begin her Administration with the Care of her foreign Concerns; and by a prudent Pursuit of her Father's Maxims, held the Balance of Power as long as she sat on

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the Throne. It may not be amiss however to observe, that as right as this Conduct was in itself, and as much as it has been applauded by Posterity, yet the Expediency of it was much doubted at the Time, and many Reflections were made on *Cecil*, who was thought to be the Author of this Measure; so that the Rectitude of any Step taken in Politicks will not secure it from Opposition, Nor is it a certain Sign that a Measure is either ill intended, or wrong in itself, because it is opposed. If either of these were to be taken for Rules, the best Men in every Nation would very frequently be left at the Mercy of the worst.

It was the Misfortune of King *James* I. that he neither understood foreign Affairs himself, nor had any Minister who was either capable or honest enough to give him proper Advice about them. To this was owing his strange Conduct in regard to the King of *Bohemia*, and his tedious Negotiation with *Spain*, the Folly of which was publick to the whole Nation, while it was seriously pursued by him and his Ministers. The Contempt that this drew upon his Councils, and the mean Figure he ever afterwards made, are sufficient Proofs of the Mischiefs that must attend a timorous Administration, and a Humour of negotiating against the Voice of the Nation.

In the next Reign things went little better; the King engaged in a *Spanish* War indeed, but whether to gratify the People or his Minister, is a Secret Time itself has not been able to discover. As this War was strangely begun, it was as unluckily prosecuted. The *French* War followed, and the unfortunate Business of *Rochelle* brought the

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Favourite to an untimely End, and entirely ruined the Affairs of his Master, who, after losing all Weight abroad, soon became unable to keep himself on the Throne at home.

Such as have written our History impartially, and without suffering themselves to be misled by Prejudices of any sort, readily confess, that the Rump-Parliament managed Foreign Affairs with equal Magnanimity and Success. They truly deserved that Praise which is commonly bestow'd upon *Cromwell*, who executed indeed with Vigour, whatever he projected, but who either understood the Interest of the Nation very little, or regarded it not at all. For he sacrificed our Trade by an unjust and impolitick War with *Spain*, and he laid the Foundation of the Power of the *French*, which has given *Europe* so much Disturbance ever since.

King *Charles* II. at his Return, had certainly right enough Notions of things; and as we never had either a Prince of greater Capacity, or more Experience, we have the better Title to censure the bad Measures he took. His first War with *Holland* was made against the Advice of the Earl of *Clarendon*, who, though he might not understand the Art of intriguing with foreign Courts, yet was an honest Man, and an able Minister, one who was perfectly acquainted with the Interest of *Great Britain*, and gave the King right Advice, if he would have followed it. After the Banishment of that Nobleman, the *French* King found it no difficult Matter to ruin King *Charles*, first by seducing him into Measures directly opposite to his true Interest, and then by inflaming the Par-

ty that oppoſed theſe Meaſures, to Acts that were not, perhaps, very conſiſtent with our Conſtitution.

By the ſame Arts that kept the laſt-mentioned Prince always uneaſy, his Brother was brought to quit his Throne, and to become an Exile at that Court, the Intrigues of which had brought all his Misfortunes upon him. Henceforward, the Syſtem of foreign Affairs became plain and ſettled, and our Princes could not avoid ſeeing and knowing what their Intereſt was in this reſpect. The Subtlety of *France* was plainly the obtaining the ſupreme Power in *Europe*, making all other Potentates ſubſervient to her Purpoſes, and never permitting them to purſue ſuch Meaſures as were moſt proper for ſecuring or extending their own. It conſequently became the Buſineſs of every State, deſirous of maintaining its natural Independency, and that happy Diſtribution of Power, which renders *Europe* the moſt potent, and at the ſame time the moſt civilized Quarter of the Globe; it became, I ſay, the Buſineſs of every ſuch State to oppoſe the Progreſs of *French* Influence, and tho' none of them were ſtrong enough to do this with Succeſs alone, a Confederacy was the only natural, indeed the only poſſible Way by which they could do it, and to their entring into ſuch a Confederacy, *Europe* owes all the Freedom ſhe has enjoy'd from the Year 1688.

It muſt be allowed by all, who are acquainted with the Character and Conduct of King *William*, as that he thoroughly underſtood, and ſteadily purſued his true Intereſt, as far as the Circumſtances of things, and the Violence of Parties would

would give him leave. He found the Crown, when he attained the Poſſeſſion of it, in a great meaſure ſtripped of its patrimonial Eſtate, and in a manner wholly dependant for its Support upon the People. The Nature of the War in which he was engaged, render'd it far more expenſive, than any which the Nation had enter'd into ſince the Days of *Henry* VIII. For the Reader will obſerve from the foregoing ſuccinct Account, that moſt of the Diſputes, in which we were from that time engaged, were managed by a naval Force, whereas we were now neceſſarily obliged to employ a Land one. In order to obtain the requiſite Supplies, in ſpite of the Oppoſition of a powerful Party, his Miniſters found themſelves conſtrained to run the Nation in Debt, which had many bad Conſequences then, and has ſince been productive of worſe. We need not wonder, that while ſo many and great Difficulties were to be ſtruggled with, and while *France* was in the Zenith of her Power, governed by a wiſe tho' ambitious Prince, aſſiſted by a great Miniſtry, and her Armies commanded by the beſt and moſt experienced Generals of that Age; I ſay, we need not wonder, that in ſuch a Conjuncture, the War, tho' juſt, honourable and neceſſary, was not carried on with great Succeſs. Indeed, if we ought to be ſurpriſed at any thing, it ſhould be at the Firmneſs, with which this Prince maintained ſo unequal a Struggle, and that after ſo many Diſappointments and Diſcouragements as he met with, both at Home and Abroad, he was at laſt able to conclude a Peace ſo advantageous to his own and the common Cauſe, as that of *Ryſwick*; which

was entirely owing to his great Abilities in the Cabinet, and to the Foreſight of the *French* King, that ſooner or later his Steadineſs would overcome all Difficulties, and accompliſh the great End he propoſed, of ſecuring the Balance of Power in *Europe*.

The Partition-Treaties which have been ſo loudly and univerſally condemned, were not the Effects of any Weakneſs in the King's Councils, but of the Weakneſs of his Government, or, to expreſs it more clearly, of his Intereſt among his Subjects. He was ſenſible of his want of Power to carry on another War, and this induced him to enter into Negotiations, from which he hoped the ſame Effects a ſucceſsful War might have produced, *viz.* the weakening of the *French* Power, by creating a Repugnancy between its Intereſts and thoſe of ſome Princes, who were then beginning to depend upon it. But this Reſource failed him; the ſame Party that hinder'd him from carrying his Point by the Sword, diſtreſs'd him on the Score of thoſe very Meaſures which their Obſtinacy had made neceſſary, and impudently aſcribed to the King's Want of Will, or Wiſdom, what they knew was owing only to his Weakneſs which was produced by their Cunning. They were then in a manifeſt Conjunction with *France*, tho' the Oppoſition they gave to the King's Meaſures, was founded on a pretended Averſion to the King's Intercourſe with that Court, upon which they had forced him. He diſengaged himſelf, however, very dextrouſly from this diſagreeable Meaſure, and with much ado form'd a ſecond Confede-

federacy, which fix'd things once again upon their old bottom.

We may be convinced, if we will not ſhut our Eyes againſt all Conviction, from the Progreſs of the War in the Reign of Queen *Anne*, that nothing but our own Miſtakes, flowing from the particular and pernicious Views of Factions, can poſſibly hinder us from holding the Balance of Power, and thereby ſecuring ourſelves, and the reſt of the Powers of *Europe*, from becoming dependant upon *France*. In the Beginning of her Reign, all Parties united heartily in the true Intereſt of their Country, and in conſequence of this, *Great Britain* was ſet at the Head of the Confederacy, which, in the ſpace of ten Years, brought the *French* Power, which had been growing for half a Century, within a Hair's-breadth of Ruin; and if at laſt our inteſtine Diviſions had not broke out again, we might have compelled her to ſuch a Peace, as would have made us and our Allies full amends for that mighty Expence of Blood and Treaſure we were at in the Proſecution of this glorious War. But ſo it happen'd, that after all our Succeſſes, we made a ſeparate Peace, by which we got little or nothing; and which was worſe, we loſt our Reputation with our Neighbours, and conſequently all Pretence to holding the Balance; which is not only a Point of Honour that *Great Britain* has a Right to claim, but a Point likewiſe of ſuch Conſequence to her Intereſt, as ſhe cannot give up without the greateſt Danger to herſelf, as well as the greateſt Inconveniency to the common Cauſe, as Experience has now ſhewn the Multi-

tade, and as Reaſon had long before taught the Wife.

I make no doubt, that many critical Readers will be offended with the Length of this Introduction; which is, however, as ſhort as I could poſſibly make it, conſiſtent with my Deſign. For, previous to the Account of preſent Meaſures, it was neceſſary to lay down ſome Rules for judging of the Rectitude of our Conduct in reſpect to Foreign Affairs; and I knew the Temper of the Age too well, to pretend to lay down any Rules, without ſhewing at the ſame time the Reaſons on which they are founded. From what has been ſaid, I think I may, without any Apprehenſion of being refuted, deduce the following Maxims; I. That it is the Duty of every Adminiſtration to make the Nation's Figure Abroad a principal Object of their Attention. II. That our Figure Abroad muſt depend upon our holding the Balance of Power, and being at the Head of that Intereſt, which oppoſes univerſal Monarchy. III. That in order to this, we muſt lay aſide all particular and Party-Prejudices, and conſider the Intereſts of our Neighbours, ſo far as they regard the Common Cauſe, as much as we do our own; and for this plain Reaſon, that unleſs we purſue ſuch a Conduct, we cannot poſſibly conſult our own.

Theſe Maxims being laid down, I ſhall, without further Ceremony proceed to examine by them our Conduct for ſome time paſt; and in order to this, I muſt take notice, that we did not revive our Charge of affecting univerſal Monarchy on *France*, before it was evidently the Thing ſhe aim'd at. To take up the hiſtorical Thread I juſt now laid down,

down, and run through all the Tranſactions, that have happened from the Peace of *Utrecht* to the preſent Time, to ſhew how reaſonable our Conjunction with the Regent was, and the preciſe Minute, when it became apparent, that the *French* had deſerted his, and reſumed their old Scheme of Policy, would draw this Diſcourſe into too great a Length, and at the ſame time fatigue the Reader with the Repetition of many things, with which he is as well, or better acquainted than I am. I ſhall therefore content myſelf with a ſuccinct Account of Cardinal *Fleury*'s Plan, ſo far as Experience and Reaſon will allow us to trace it; and this, in order to render it evident, that our Interpoſition was abſolutely neceſſary, and perfectly right, provided the Advice given to King *Charles* the Second by ſo many Parliaments, the Plan laid down by King *William*, proſecuted ſo ſucceſsfully in the ſucceeding Reign, and to which all the Parties in the Nation have declared themſelves thoroughly reconciled ſince, be a proper Rule of Conduct, eſpecially when enforced by the repeated Reſolutions of the laſt and preſent Parliament, and, till very lately, by the Voice of the whole Nation.

The laſt War between *France*, *Spain* and *Sardinia*, and the late Emperor, or rather the Peace made at its Concluſion, firſt gave the World juſt Grounds to ſuſpect the Sincerity of Cardinal *Fleury*'s Declarations. The Acquiſition of *Lorrain*, without the giving of any Equivalent by *France*, for to the Grand Dutchy of *Tuſcany* ſhe never had any Pretenſions, was enough to alarm all her Neighbours, and to put them upon their Guard;

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tho' I confeſs, as Things then ſtood, it might not have been prudent to have declared immediately againſt her. The unaccountable Aſcendency, which his Eminency gain'd over the Court of *Vienna*, by his pretending to become a cordial Friend to the Pragmatick Sanction, could not but oblige ſuch Powers, as had a real Concern for the Intereſt of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, to act with Caution; ſince any vigorous Meaſures of theirs might have afforded *France* a Colour for doing that, which ſince, confiding in her own Strength, ſhe has had the Boldneſs to act with a bare Face. The Peace made with the *Turks*, and ſome Tranſactions which follow'd it, would very probably have open'd his Imperial Majeſty's Eyes, if he had not been ſnatched from the World by a ſudden Death. This was the Signal to the Cardinal's Emiſſaries in all the Courts of *Europe*, to begin their Attacks on all the ſeveral Balances, by which the Tranquillity of the Powers of *Europe* is maintained in its ſeveral Quarters; and it muſt be confeſſed, that they exerted themſelves ſo vigorouſly, and were ſo amply ſupplied with Money, and Promiſes, which were then eſteemed equal to Money, that in an Inſtant the Face of Things was changed, and the Affairs of moſt of the Northern, *German*, and *Italian* Courts, were managed by Directions from the Cabinet at *Verſailles*.

The maintaining a proper Balance in the North hath been always eſteem'd a Point of the utmoſt Importance to the general Peace and Safety of *Europe*, and no Power ever found an Intereſt in deſtroying this Balance but *France*. It was Cardinal *Richlieu* brought the *Swedes* into *Germany*, in or-

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der to break the Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria*; and when he found that the great *Guſtavus Adolphus* became too powerful to remain a Creature of his, it has been juſtly ſuſpected that he found means to take him off. Since that Time the *French* have more than once ſerv'd their Purpoſes by their Intrigues in this Kingdom, tho' the moſt judicious Politicians among the *Swedes* long ago diſcerned that their own Affairs were much hurt by them; which induced the very learned *Puffendorf* to write a Treatiſe upon this Subject, wherein he has fully demonſtrated, how dangerous it was to the true Intereſt of *Sweden* to become the Inſtruments of that ambitious Court. Every Body knows what Pains was taken by *France* to ſecure the late *Charles* XII. when he was in the Zenith of his Power, and how little Regard ſhe ſhewed for him or his Concerns, when he fell into Diſtreſs. From the Time of his Deceaſe, and the Acceſſion of the late Queen and her Conſort, the *Swedes* became a new kind of People; they recovered their Liberty, reviv'd their Trade, reſtored their Affairs in all Reſpects, and by the Care of an honeſt Adminiſtration at home, and a ſteady Adherence to their natural Allies abroad, heal'd in a very ſhort Time the dangerous Wounds their State had received during the long and unequal War, into which the Obſtinacy of their late King plunged them.

With this Nation the Cardinal began, and that he might mold them into a fit Temper to ſerve his Purpoſes, ruined their Affairs, and threw them into the utmoſt Confuſion. The Buſineſs of *Poland* gave him an Opportunity of making the firſt Impreſſions upon them. King *Staniſlaus* had been the

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old Ally of *Charles* XII. Many of the *Swedish* Officers had ſerv'd under him, and ſome of the Nobility had a great Reſpect for him. This diſpoſed them to be well enough pleaſed with the Scheme which *France* ſeem'd to have form'd in his favour; and under Colour of promoting it, they were drawn into ſome Practices of which the World knows very little, and had ſtill known leſs, but for the unfortunate End of Baron *Sinclair*. This Opening made way for the Change of the old Miniſtry, and the reviving of that Spirit which ſhew'd itſelf in the two laſt Diets, and produced the War with *Ruſſia*, as extraordinary in its Management as it has been unfortunate in its Event. Every Body knows that *French* Money and *French* Influence have had theſe Effects, but every Body is not acquainted with the Reaſons that made them ſo neceſſary to the *French* Syſtem. To enter into a diſtinct Detail of them would take up too much Room, and therefore I ſhall mention only a few. Before this War broke out, all the Northern Powers were rather averſe, than well inclined to the *French* Deſign of ruining the Houſe of *Auſtria*; and this made it abſolutely neceſſary to kindle a War in this Quarter of the World, before any open Attempt was made to put that Scheme in Execution. But beſides their general Notions of the Expediency of maintaining the *Auſtrian* Power, the *Swedes* were under a particular Obligation, as having guaranteed the Pragmatick Sanction. Laſtly, their Engagements with the Maritime Powers would naturally have drawn them to have acted a Part very oppoſite to that which they have ſince taken; and therefore we need not wonder,

der, either at the vaſt Expence the *French* were at to force them into this War, or the little Care they have taken to bring them out of it with Credit.

It was the Buſineſs of the Cardinal to embroil them with *Ruſſia*, let the Diſpute end how it would; for by this means they were diverted from purſuing their true Intereſts, and the *Miniſtry* were obliged to turn their Thoughts to this War, inſtead of affording a prompt and powerful Aſſiſtance to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, to which they were enough inclined. The being revenged of *Ruſſia* was another Stroke of the Cardinal's Craft. The Affair of *Poland* has ſhewn ſufficiently the Temper of that Court, and that the Conſequence of having a *Poliſh* Prince of *French* Principles was thoroughly underſtood there. As to any Concern in the Intrigues which produced the late Revolution in that Empire, I am diſpoſed to acquit the Cardinal, becauſe it was apparently more his Intereſt to have [illegible] by inteſtine Diviſions, than to well [illegible] as it now ſeems to be. But that the *French* might countenance the Malecontents, with a View to keep up thoſe Diviſions, and with no Deſign to facilitate ſuch a Settlement, is highly probable; and for this, even the preſent Court can owe them no great Thanks. Thus far the Plan was well laid, and properly executed; for the North was all in a Flame before any Sparks of War appeared in *Germany*; and that I have given a fair Account of Gallick Policy in this Part of the World, will appear to any Man who conſiders the Pains that has been taken to draw off the Court of *Denmark* alſo, and to engage it to

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recall the Troops, which had entred into the Service of the King our Sovereign, and had been employ'd to secure his Electorate.

The Balance of Power in *Italy* was likewise to be overturned; and in order to this, *Spain* revived her Pretensions to the Dutchy of *Milan*, though so often given up, and though that Claim was absolutely irreconcileable to the Treaties by which *Philip* V. had obtained the peaceable Possession of *Spain* and the *Indies*. *Parma* and *Placentia* were likewise to have been taken away, notwithstanding the more than equivalent, which Don *Carlos* holds in lieu of them. The Duke of *Modena* was to have had his Pretensions satisfied, or at least he was told so; and his *Sardinian* Majesty, if he could have been prevail'd on to enter into this Scheme, might have had what Share he pleased of the Spoil; but that wise and generous Prince acted upon Maxims of another kind, and chose rather to be content with Territories which descended from his Ancestors, than by entring into so foul a Treaty of Partition, to aggrandize himself at the Expence of a House, to which his Family owed so many Obligations. If this System had taken place, the House of *Austria* had been reduced to the single Dutchy of *Tuscany*, and must have held that too by a precarious Tenure, I mean, till *France* had so thoroughly established her Plan, as to have no longer any Fears about *Lorrain*. Such were the Dispositions made for subverting the Independency both of the North and South, and for leaving no Power in either, capable of giving the least Disturbance to the House of *Bourbon*. Let us now proceed to the grand Design of entooning *Germa-*

ny in such a manner, as that, instead of being the Bulwark of *European* Liberty, it might be entirely subjected to the overgrown Power of *France*.

In the first place, it was contrived, that different Agents, at the several Courts of the most considerable *German* Princes, should, upon the Demise of the Emperor, insinuate, that this was the proper Time to push their respective Pretensions on the Dominions of the House of *Austria*; and as they were drawn to listen to this destructive Doctrine, they were encouraged to disclose their Designs to each other, and afterwards to make their joint Application to *France*. It is not to be wonder'd, that so many Princes, having severally fixed their Views on their own particular Interests, should for a Moment neglect those of *Germany*; or that, observing the Readiness of *France* to gratify them all in their respective Desires, and her seeming Disinterestedness on this Occasion, they should consider her rather as their common Friend, than as the ancient and irreconcileable Enemy of the Empire. The Secrecy too, with which the Nature of these Negociations rendred it necessary they should be carried on, secured them from those Objections, which the ablest and wisest Counsellors in every Court would have raised against them, had they been made publick. But the close Intrigues of the *French* Ministers, their great Dexterity in exaggerating private Advantages, and eclipsing those Inconveniencies which they must draw after them; the immense Sums of Money they had it in their Power to squander, and the Probability of executing their whole Scheme, before the rest of *Europe* recovered from its Amaze-

ment at seeing it break out, carried all before them for a Time; and without doubt, *Henry* at *Versailles* was esteemed another *Richlieu*, or perhaps a greater Minister than he, though it is certain he only wrought upon his Plan.

We have seen, what the *German* Princes might propose to themselves by giving into this Scheme; but we have not hitherto adverted to the Advantages which *France* would have derived from it. In the first place, let it be remembred, that its formidable Rival the House of *Austria* would not have been humbled only, but subverted; her Dominions would not only have been taken away, but shared amongst the Friends of the House of *Bourbon*; and this alone had been more than a sufficient Compensation for that prodigious Waste of Treasure, into which the *French* Monarch run, to establish this System he had been so long contriving. But then let us, in the next place, reflect on the Situation, that *Germany* would have been in, after this Scheme had taken place. The *Bavarian*, *Prussian*, *Saxon*, and *Palatine* Houses would have been strengthened with the Spoils of that of *Austria*, and brought to such an Equality in point of Strength, as, by the Help of *French* Intrigues, would have hindred any Union in Support of *German* Liberty. For though it be true, that the Elector *Palatine* is far from having either Dominions or Revenues proportionable to those of the other three Princes, yet his close Conjunction with *France*, and the Vicinity of his Territories to those of that Kingdom, would have made him as useful, and at the same time a surer Ally than any of them. Thus the good old *German* Forms of Government,

vernment, built on just and generous Maxims, tending equally to the Honour of the Head, and to the Safety of the Members of the Empire, would have been in effect destroyed, and a new Form every way much worse introduced; so that thenceforward the Head of the Empire would have been distinguished only by sounding Titles, and an useless Precedency, the Direction of all things remaining in the Cabinet of *Versailles*, whence Orders, couched in Memorials, would have issued through the Canal of its Ministers, in the Courts of these Princes.

But if this Change would have been so unhappy for *Germany*, it would not have been less unlucky for the Maritime Powers. As for the United Provinces, they would not only have been deprived of their natural Allies and Protectors, which have more than once saved them from becoming a Province to *France*, but they would have been on all Sides surrounded by their Enemies, so that their Trade must have been speedily affected; and indeed the very Being of their State would have been rendred precarious. If our Situation as an Island had put us into a better Condition, yet could it never have lasted long without Friends, without Allies on the Continent; we should have been unable to have protected our Trade and our Plantations, and much more incapable of making head against *France*. I have indeed heard it suggested, and that by some, of whose Judgments I have a high Opinion, that we might have secured a new Balance of Power, by joining whatever Prince became possessed of the greater Part of the *Austrian* Dominions; but in order to this, we must have violated

violated our Treaties in as high a Degree as *France* has done; and though this might be an eaſy Step in an arbitrary Country, where Right and Wrong depend not upon the Nature of Things, but upon the Wills of Men; yet here I dare ſay it would have been impoſſible to have got this Syſtem reliſhed. The whole Nation reſented the ill Uſage the Queen of *Hungary* had met with, and the Unanimity of all Parties in her favour, ſufficiently ſhews that ſuch a Project would not have been feaſable, and that we are not ſo totally corrupted, as ſome ſanguine People imagine. Suppoſing however, the thing had been practicable; ſuppoſing that ſuch a Step as this would have created a new Balance, muſt it not have been attended with great Danger and Expence? Would this new-raiſed Prince have quitted his Founder and Protector to court us? That certainly he would never have done, becauſe thereby he would have immediately run a great Riſk, and that upon uncertain Grounds. Well then, muſt we have courted him? If we had, I doubt it would have been to no Purpoſe. To ſuch a Power an Arbitrary Prince muſt have been a more natural and more ſtanch Ally than any free People whatever. It is therefore clear to me, that the Notion of creating a new Balance is a meer political Paradox, which Men of great Parts might plauſibly defend, but which they could notwithſtanding never be brought to approve in their Hearts.

We have now ſeen two things clearly made out; the one, that *Great Britain* cannot ſafely ſit ſtill and ſee the Affairs of the Continent go this way or that with Indifference; and, ſecondly, that

if

if ever she was bound in Interest to bestir herself in favour of her Neighbours, and against the ambitious Designs of an overgrown and overbearing Power, it was in the present Case, when an old Man, who had gained a high Esteem from his Character for Probity and Moderation, suddenly threw off the Mask, and, by his Intrigues, thought to subjugate all *Europe* to the Will of his Master, that is, to his own. I might have mentioned some other Consequences of this, which might have affected us more immediately; but that I decline saying any thing, the Truth of which is not notorious, or mentioning such Apprehensions as some People might stile imaginary, when the undeniable Mischiefs this System would have produced are so many and so great. In a word, if the Safety or Tranquility of *Europe*; if the Freedom of its respective States, and the several Balances of Power in the North, in *Italy* and *Germany*, deserve at all our Attention; or, to carry the Matter still further, if our own Independency, if the Security of our Commerce, if the Sovereignty of the Sea, upon which we pique ourselves so much, be at all worth our Care, then was this a Crisis that demanded all our Attention, and Respect to our Interests abroad ought to have superseded all such Concerns (as were incompatible with them) at home.

That these were the Sentiments of our present Ministers, even before they came into the Ministry, is what all the World knows, and that they were in those times taken for the Sentiments of the Nation in general, is what their bittereſt Enemies cannot deny; we need not therefore wonder that

that they have purſued them ever ſince with the utmoſt Diligence, nor ought we to cenſure them on that account, till it can be ſhewn that theſe Meaſures are wrong in themſelves; and if even that were poſſible, we might ſtill plead in their Excuſe, that not only they, but the whole Nation were miſtaken. This, however, is certainly out of the Caſe, ſuch as really wiſh well to the preſent Eſtabliſhment, to the Peace, Welfare and Trade of their Country, muſt agree as to the Rectitude of theſe Proceedings in themſelves, and can entertain no Doubts, unleſs it be as to the Wiſdom and Vigour with which they have been carried on, and therefore let us apply ourſelves to clear up theſe. It muſt be allowed, that when the preſent Miniſtry entred into Power, they found ſome Steps taken towards the counteracting the *French* Scheme, and theſe they have purſued and perfected with ſuch Alterations as were requiſite to give them greater and more immediate Influence; they found Armies on foot, and Fleets abroad; they have made uſe of both, not for Shew and Parade, as ſome have maliciouſly, or at leaſt unknowingly pretended, but for all the Purpoſes, that, as things were circumſtanced at home and abroad, they could poſſibly be brought to ſerve, as will be ſhewn hereafter.

In order to do all this, they have indeed taken ſome Steps, which, how juſtly I will not ſay, has expoſed them to ſome Degree of Cenſure. Amongſt theſe I think we may principally reckon three: Firſt, the propoſing and obtaining the Grant of very large Supplies from Parliament; but without theſe what could they have done? What Miniſtry ever

ever pretended to carry on a War without them? What could our Allies abroad have hoped, if they had not been obtained? Or, what would our Foes have had to fear? That the Parliament was very liberal is confessed; that it was at all lavish, no Man can suspect, who considers why they gave, and to whom. Part of the Supplies were on account of a War, in which we were previously engaged, not only with the Consent, but by the Advice of Parliament, the rest for the Support of the Common Cause, the Importance of which I have already demonstrated, and if it were necessary I could produce very authentic Proof, that the Eyes of all *Europe*, I mean of all the Independent Part of *Europe*, for as to the Creatures and Dependants of *France*, as they are *Asiaticks* in their Nature, I think they ought not to be comprehended under that Name, turned their Eyes upon our Parliament, to see whether that august Assembly would once more furnish the Means for their Deliverance, or whether, through an ill-tim'd Frugality, they would give up their Neighbours first, and themselves in the End, to a Condition little better than Slavery. On this head therefore, I think the Ministry ought to stand acquitted, especially if we consider, that all these Sums, as they were obtained for certain Purposes, so they are appropriated, and must be accounted for; which clearly shews, that, as they were the Nation's Money before the Grant, so they are now to be applied for the Nation's Service, according to the Directions of their Representatives.

The second Objection made to their Conduct has been their endeavouring to quiet our Fears,

and ſtifle our Animoſities; whereas, in the Opinion of ſome People, they were bound in Duty to puſh our Diſputes to the utmoſt, and to have ſatisfied the Party they headed, by the Ruin of that which they have defeated. But to a candid Enquirer their Method of proceeding muſt appear equally prudent and juſt. For when a Nation is engaged in a dangerous and expenſive War abroad, there cannot ſurely be a wiſer or better Conduct purſued, than that of keeping all things calm at home, and, on the other hand, in a free Nation the Extinction of Parties is no more a deſirable thing than the Extinction of Paſſions would be in human Nature, when fierce and unbridled, they are apt to produce Miſchiefs; and yet unleſs excited by them, we ſhould ſeldom have Spirits enough to perform any thing eminently good. Their not going therefore ſuch ſanguine Lengths, as ſome People expected, demonſtrates their Temper and Moderation, and gives us Ground to hope their whole Adminiſtration will be of this Complection; and ſurely the *Engliſh* Nation will never think it a fit Motive for Complaint, that the Miniſtry are averſe to Acts of Power, and are deſirous of keeping their Authority within Bounds.

A third Topick of Cenſure has been their not procuring the Repeal of ſome Laws, and the enacting of others, which have been thought neceſſary for the Nation's Service, and which, as good Servants to the Nation, they were bound to procure. But thoſe who are fond of laying this Cenſure upon them, have not perhaps reflected, whether at this Juncture it might not be proper even for the warmeſt Friends to thoſe ſalutary

Laws to suffer them to be postponed. The Heads of a Party will always push the Demands of their Party, whether they be seasonable or not; but the Servants of the Publick must have Respect to fit Times and proper Opportunities. They must finish one great Task before they attempt another, and while they are engaged in a particular War, and are perhaps at the Eve of a general one, no considerate Man will be surprized that they are loth to promote any Alterations in the Constitution, which, whenever they are brought about, require long Deliberation, and the utmost Caution that we may not be hastily brought to think of Alterations again. He who is for delaying a thing, is not to be judged from thence averse to that thing, especially if it be a Matter of Weight and Difficulty; on the contrary, it is most probable, that he avoids Hurry, that he may perform it the more perfectly; and this we are the rather bound to believe, if no formal Declarations have been made against it. On the whole then, all that from the strict Rules of Evidence we can collect from this Behaviour of theirs, amounts to no more, than that they judge our Foreign Concerns, at this particular Juncture, of such high Consequence, that they are unwilling to embarass themselves farther than Necessity obliges them with the Care of other things. Now, to be satisfied as to the Truth of this, and that we may be sure this is the real Motive which has led them to this manner of acting, we are to consider, whether, after all these Precautions, they have acted as if this had been the principal Object of their Attention, and whether, from the Pains they have taken about it, we have

reaſon to expect they will be equally indefatigable and ſucceſsful in ſettling our domeſtick Concerns.

As to Affairs in the North, they are ſo viſibly changed for the better, that it cannot but afford every *Engliſhman* a ſenſible Pleaſure to contemplate this Change. We had indeed concluded a Treaty with the late Regency in *Ruſſia*, and poſſeſſed Count *Oſterman*, one of the greateſt Miniſters in *Europe*, of the Neceſſity there was of oppoſing the *French* Scheme, which tended as much to limit the Independency of the Nothern Powers, as any of the other States in *Europe*; but on the Ruin of this Government, and the Misfortune of Count *Oſterman*, this whole Structure was overturned, and we had the Work to begin afreſh. I do not mean by this, that the *Ruſſians* were indiſpoſed to an Alliance with us, or to break through the Treaty lately concluded; but that the new Adminiſtration had not the ſame Notions as to the general Syſtem of *Europe*, with which their Predeceſſors were poſſeſſed. There was beſides, a very artful *French* Miniſter then reſident there, who had great perſonal Credit with the *Czarina*, and who could not but derive from thence ſome Weight with her Miniſters: Yet all theſe Obſtacles have been overcome; the Iniquity of the *French* Deſigns has been again made manifeſt; the *Ruſſians* have been ſhewn how treacherouſly that Court dealt with them, in reſpect both to War and Peace, and the Effect of theſe Repreſentations has been what we could have wiſh'd, for the *French* Credit is much declined; their Miniſter is treated with Civility inſtead of Confidence, and a new Treaty

has

has been concluded with us, the Nature of which must be very ſpeedily known from its Effects.

As to the *Swedes*, they too have been taught to open their Eyes, and to look with Horrour on the *French* Practices for their Deſtruction. To be convinced of this, we need but look on the Speech made by the Marſhal to the preſent Diet, wherein he aſcribes all the Miſchiefs they have ſuffered to foreign Influence over their Adminiſtration. We have a Miniſter there who is in the higheſt Confidence with the moſt conſiderable of the Nobility, and all the true Patriots in that Kingdom, as an undeniable Proof of which, we have ſeen the *Swediſh* Miniſter here demand the Interpoſition of our Sovereign, where that of the *French* King had failed; and we have the Satisfaction of knowing, that the King has not only promiſed to uſe his good Offices with the *Ruſſian* Court, but that theſe have alſo been accepted; and though it may be true, that *French* Influence is not entirely expelled that Country, yet it is pretty apparent, that it is upon the Declenſion, and that ſtrongly, ſince the *French* now court the *Danes*, and by engaging them in great Armaments by Land and Sea, think to intimidate the *Swedes*, when they can no longer command them. But when once a Peace is ſeuled between them and *Ruſſia*, this will be found a very feeble Expedient; and Experience will convince the King of *Denmark*, that precarious Subſidies, and an unavailing Treaty of Commerce, are but indifferent Compenſations for the Loſs of uſeful Allies, and incurring the Jealouſy of all his Neighbours.

Before we quit this Subject, it is neceſſary to obſerve

obſerve, that the *French* have great Advantages over us in their Negotiations with theſe Princes. Whatever we do, muſt be done fairly and openly, from the Nature of our Conſtitution, and all the World muſt underſtand, upon what Terms we purchaſe their Friendſhip. But it is not ſo with *France*; the Miniſter there is only accountable to his Maſter, and therefore a liberal Diſtribution of *French* Gold to private Perſons may be ſo managed, as to produce greater Effects, than much larger Sums given openly, and for the Benefit of a Nation. If therefore, in ſpite of theſe Difficulties, we are in a fair way of triumphing over *French* Arts, and of bringing the *Swedes* to adhere ſteadily to their own Intereſts, and thereby promote ours, and the common Good of *Europe*, we muſt not be ſurpriſed, that this has required Time and Application; nor ought we to refuſe their juſt Praiſes to thoſe, who have happily conducted the Negotiations, that were neceſſary to ſo ſalutary a Purpoſe.

Our Interpoſition in *Italy* has been ſtill more efficacious, as it was begun very early, and our Negotiations conducted with the greateſt Secrecy. The utmoſt pains was taken to raiſe the Jealouſy of the *Italian* States, and to ſhew the dangerous Conſequences of increaſing the Power of *Spain* in *Italy*. This had in ſome meaſure its effect, tho' the mountainous Promiſes of the *Spaniſh* Miniſtry overcame the Duke of *Modena*, and engaged him to act ſuch a Part, as has drawn upon him a juſt Puniſhment. When this was done, and the King of *Sardinia* appeared inclined to enter into an Alliance for ſecuring *Italy* from the Effects of

foreign

foreign Invasions, by guaranteeing their Dominions to the present Possessors; this Disposition was happily improved; and tho' the Territories of her *Hungarian* Majesty, and the Grand-Duke were so drain'd of Troops, that it scarce seem'd possible to raise a Force sufficient to look that of *Spain* in the Face; yet in consequence of this Alliance, and the Subsidies granted for support of it, the Scene was suddenly changed, and the combined Powers, from the very breaking out of the War, have been superior to the *Spaniards* and *Neapolitans*, notwithstanding the former transported into *Italy* a veteran Army commanded by the Duke *De Montemar*, the same General who conquered *Naples* and *Sicily* for *Don Carlos*, and was deservedly look'd upon, as the best Officer they had.

The Assistance given his *Sardinian* Majesty, by our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, has been equally ready and successful, insomuch that the second Scheme of *Spain*, of entering *Italy* through *Piedmont*, has been render'd as abortive as the first; and their short-lived Gleam of Success in *Savoy*, has proved a new Misfortune to them, through the excellent Conduct of our victorious Ally. Yet even this might have been render'd precarious, but for our well-tim'd Visit to *Naples*; a Measure so vigorous, and so dexterously conducted, that Posterity will read with Surprise the Story of Commodore *Martin*'s Negotiation, who found a Way to compleat a Treaty of such Consequence, at one Interview, and overturn'd the three Years Preparations of the *Neapolitan* Court in an Hour. If either of the Branches of the House of *Bourbon* had gained such signal Advantages as these, what triumphant

triumphant Arches, what Medals, what Inſcriptions had blazon'd their Wiſdom and Valour to ſucceeding Times? The *Britiſh* Reputation ſtands in no need of ſuch Helps; a bare Relation of the Matter of Fact is ſufficient for our Purpoſe, and the Terror, ſtruck by our Squadron into the City of *Naples*, recorded in their own Hiſtories, and by their own Writers, will abundantly eſtabliſh the Memory of this noble Exploit. In conſequence of this, the Hopes of *Spain* were a ſecond Time blaſted, the *Neapolitan* Army returned into the Dominions of *Naples*; and the *Spaniards* retired precipitately, not well knowing where to go. The Motions they have ſince made, are rather Teſtimonies of a reſtleſs Reſentment, than of any thing elſe, and if the peremptory Commands of the Court of *Madrid* ſhould engage the King of the Two *Sicilies* to break his Neutrality, the Conſequences cannot but prove fatal to himſelf. Theſe are Things notorious to the whole World; and if we reflect on the vaſt Expence, with which the *Spaniards* tranſported their Forces into *Italy*; the immenſe Sums that it has coſt to maintain them there, and the Neceſſity they are under of continuing, how little ſoever they are able, all theſe Expences: I ſay, if we reflect on this, and on the Ruin of ſo formidable a Force, we muſt diſcern, that nothing could have been projected ſo effectual for the Deſtruction of the *Spaniſh* Power, as this Contrivance of their own, which has at once exhauſted their Treaſures, and entirely ruined their Armies; neither of which they have it in their Power, while this War continues, to recruit.

We have hitherto conſidered the Conduct of *Great-*

Great-Britain on this Side, in the Light only of an Ally to their *Hungarian* and *Sardinian* Majesties; but it will be eaſy to ſhew, that ſhe has not behaved with leſs Skill or Succeſs, in reſpect to her own Affairs. By the Uſe that has been made of our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, we have effectually ſecured our own Trade, and as effectually deſtroyed that of our Enemies. I content myſelf with that general Expreſſion, becauſe a more particular Explication would be at this time improper. I may, however, be allowed to ſay, that we have cut off all Commerce between the *Spaniſh* Provinces, and have prevented their ſending any Supplies by Sea to their Army in *Italy*. We burnt their Gallies, the moſt uſeful Ships they had, in the Bay of *St. Tropez*, we have inſulted their Coaſts, we have forced them to fortify almoſt all Places near the Sea; and at this Inſtant, when they can ſo little afford it, they are providing, at a great Expence, againſt an Invaſion at *Majorca*. Add to this, that we keep their Fleet block'd up at *Toulon*, and by this means have deprived our Enemy of their Naval Force, as we have before ſhewn, that it is intirely owing to us they have loſt their Land one. What more could have been done againſt an Enemy, that is never ſeen but behind Entrenchments on Shore, and never appears at all at Sea, I muſt confeſs I am at a Loſs to know; and if what has been already ſaid, be not a full and ſatisfactory Anſwer to that trite Queſtion, What is become of the War with *Spain*? I muſt conclude it unanſwerable; becauſe thoſe who aſk it are reſolved not to be anſwered. We have on this Head done all that could be done, and tho

some of our wise Politicians may expect, yet they would have found it impossible to do more.

After making it evident, that the Tempest raised by *France* in the North, in order to prevent the Powers there from interfering with her Designs, has died into a Calm, which is in a fair way of being improved to the Ruin of all her Projects; and that her Arts, as well as the *Spanish* Arms, have been intirely baffled in *Italy*, and exposed to the Contempt of all the sage Politicians of that Country; let us next proceed to *Germany*, and see, what has been done to unravel her Schemes, and render her utmost Efforts impotent there, notwithstanding the prodigal Waste of Blood and Treasure in order to make them effectual. But, previous to this, it will be proper to observe, that *France* had a much greater Advantage over us here, than in the North; she could negociate feelingly with the *German* Princes, while we could do no more, than endeavour to make them sensible of their own Interests. Cardinal *Fleury* might apply Millions of *French* Gold, and be sure of the Applause both of his Master and his Subjects; but if an *English* Minister had ventured to lay out any such Sums, he must have hazarded, nay, he must have lost his Head; and if he had contrived to give them under some colourable Pretext, the Discovery of this No-Crime would have been fatal to him. Besides, the Situation of *France* on the Continent enabled her to execute her Treaties as soon as they were concluded; she marched her Armies at once into the very Heart of *Germany*, and many of its Princes and States made a Semblance of receiving them with Joy, who were in reality ter-

tified

dised at the Sight. After all, the bare marching of these Troops was not sufficient either to warrant our declaring against *France*, or even to awaken those who were more nearly concerned than ourselves, to make a suitable Provision against its Consequences, by beginning to form a Confederacy. In short, there was a Necessity for suffering *France* to attempt the Execution of her Plan before we could counteract it, and we were obliged to let the Enemy strike first, that we might be able to strike at all.

The first Step that was taken, in order to disappoint the deep-laid Designs of the *French* in *Germany*, was, to supply the Queen of *Hungary* with a Sum of Money, as an Earnest of our Intentions, and for the immediate Expences in which so unequal a War engaged her. This I do not hesitate to ascribe to the present Ministry, though it was given before they came into Power, for Reasons that are so well known they need not be mentioned in this Place. The next was to attempt the opening the Eyes of some of the *German* Princes, who, from selfish Views to their own Interests, were not only engaged in a most unnatural Alliance for destroying the Power of the House of *Austria*, but were likewise made the Tools of their own Destruction, by accepting such a Plan of Partition as must have thrown them into never-ending Controversies one with another: But as this necessary Work was found to go on very slowly, and as *France* seemed resolved to push her Scheme even with greater Vigour than she had shewn at first, it was thought requisite to take quicker Steps on our Side, and with that View Proposals

were made to the *Dutch*. Abundance of harsh Things have been said about those Proposals, by some uneasy People, as if the Interest of these Kingdoms had been postponed in that Negotiation, and that all we proposed to their High Mightinesses was in favour and for the sake of the E— of *H*—. Now, tho' I pretend to have no Lights from the Ministry, and do not set up for a first-rate Politician myself; yet I think I can shew this to be no more than an ill-natured Reflection, grounded on an accidental Circumstance every way harmless in itself.

The Prevalency of the *French* Power in *Germany*, as it certainly affected *Great-Britain*, so it threatned likewise his Majesty's *German* Dominions, and this merely on account of his Conduct in relation to the Queen of *Hungary*. What Wonder therefore if, being ill treated in both Characters, his Majesty resented it in both? or, why should his *British* Subjects be either surprized or displeased, that, till Things grow riper, and the Season more fit for *Great-Britain* to declare herself, his Majesty was willing to concert the Measures then immediately necessary for the Service of the common Cause as Elector of *Hanover*. This is a fair, an easy, and a natural Account of this Measure; and though it be true, that the *Dutch* did not come so readily into it as might have been expected, yet this was not certainly owing to any Dislike they had to an Alliance with *Hanover*, as has been very unkindly, and, at the same time, very idly alledged; but because they thought the Mischief was not as yet come home to them, and that, as Things stood, they might sufficiently se-

cure

cure themſelves by arming without fighting. This is alſo a natural Account of their Conduct, and I am thoroughly ſatisfied a true Account of it. All the Stories that have been propagated of their ill Treatment of our Miniſters, are abſolutely falſe and groundleſs, if we except their avoiding an actual Compliance with our Demands, by alledging very plauſible Excuſes; the Grounds of which Excuſes are already, many of them, taken away, and the reſt are daily wearing out.

While the Miniſtry were thus uſing their utmoſt Endeavours, to give a ſpeedy Check to the *French* Greatneſs, there happened a great Variety of Events in *Germany*, which, by degrees, contributed to give a new Face to Affairs there. The King of *Pruſſia* was brought to an Agreement with the Queen of *Hungary*, by our Mediation; and the Agreement then concluded, and the definitive Treaty which has ſince ſucceeded, will be found to have changed the Syſtem of Things in *Germany* entirely. The Conſequences of this Treaty indeed have followed but ſlowly, as, When do Things of that Nature follow otherwiſe? But they have followed, and are daily following: The Miſt has already been removed from before the Eyes of two great Princes, and it will very quickly appear, that other Princes are diſpoſed to follow their Examples. The *French*, in ſpite of all the Advantages which have been before enumerated, were a long Time before they brought their Schemes to bear. Where then is the Wonder that we have not ſucceeded ſuddenly in ours?

It has, I know, been ſaid, that our Mediation had very little Weight with the King of *Pruſſia*.

And

Still it has been likewise said, that the Queen of *Hungary* gained very little by that Negociation: For the same People say, that she then gave him all *Silesia* to be master, whereas she might before have had him on her Side for half that Price. But all this has been said only by visionary People in their gloomy Fits; and it happens very unluckily for them, that, while they are saying this, they contradict themselves. Both the Courts of *Vienna* and *Berlin* have acknowledged the Influence of the *English* Mediation, and that in the most sensible and effective Manner. As to what is said of the Queen of *Hungary* losing by this Agreement, it can have no Weight with any Body that considers the Temper of that Princess, and the Firmness she has shewn on all Occasions. If she gave up all, or the greatest Part of *Silesia* to the King of *Prussia*, does it follow that this is an absolute Loss? Or, because he stipulates, by this Treaty, no more than a Neutrality, is it therefore certain that she shall never have warmer Sentiments? If the Treaty of *Berlin* had only determined the War between those Powers, and had had no further Consequences, I can scarce conceive why both Courts should pay such high Compliments to the Earl of *Hyndford*. But if this Treaty was to be the Basis of other Treaties, and if in consequence of this Reconciliation, Things were to run into a new Channel, and the Politicks of *Germany* to undergo such a Change, as through the King of *Prussia*'s Influence, to give a happy Turn to the Affairs of the Queen of *Hungary*, and to the Interests of all the Princes of *Germany* in general, it is very easy then to see this Treaty in another

Light.

Light. In truth, if we do not see it in this Light we must fall into the same Blunder with those perverting People who made the before-mentioned Objections. It was not the Influence of *Great-Britain*, say they, but the Impression made by the Queen of *Hungary*'s Arms at the Battle of *Cassau*, that induced the King of *Prussia* to make Peace. And in the same Breath they tell you, that this Prince, who made Peace because he was beaten, made it upon better Terms than he asked before. Is not this very consistent and probable? But then *Great-Britain* prevailed upon the Queen of *Hungary*, immediately after this glorious Victory at *Cassau*, to grant the King of *Prussia* twice as much as she obstinately refused him before, and this too upon worse Terms. Yet *Great-Britain*, they say, had no Interest with either of the Powers; but it was the Battle of *Cassau* produced this extraordinary Peace, by which the Vanquished got, and the Victor gave away, so great a Country. Are not these refined Politicks beyond all Comprehension? Had we not better take up with the former Account, which reconciles this whole Transaction to common Sense, and to the Consequences which this Treaty has certainly had; I mean the Accession of the King of *Poland*, as Elector of *Saxony*; and the new Negotiations which are not yet ripe enough for us to give any certain Account of, but which must speedily discover themselves, and that questionless on the Side of the Queen of *Hungary*, who seems to be perfectly satisfied with the Train Things are now in.

That hitherto an Alliance has not been formed sufficient to give Law to *France*, and to prescribe

such

such Terms to that ambitious Power, as may secure Safety to the House of *Austria*, and Peace to the rest of *Europe*, is true; but then this is not at all owing to any Fault or Negligence in the *British* Ministry, as even their Enemies admit. They have taken all the Pains that could be taken to induce the *Dutch* to enter into their Views, and to make the Cause of publick Liberty their Care, before they were forced to it by a Concern for their own Safety. If in this they have not fully succeeded, it ought not to be ascribed either to want of Abilities, or of Application at least, so long as Divisions *here* and *there* afford a much shorter and clearer Explication of the Difficulties they have met with. But, on the other hand, if all this be true, it is no less true that the utmost Efforts of *France* have been baffled by the Schemes our Ministers have formed, and by the Succours this Nation has supplied. It is as true, that, in consequence of several Treaties that have been negotiating with as great Diligence, and as much Success as the Nature of such Things would admit, that there is now the highest Probability we shall be able to form a new Confederacy, as powerful as the old one; and which, if we can but agree amongst ourselves, till it has wrought its Effects, will effectually reduce the exorbitant Power of *France*, and settle the Balance of Power in *Europe*, in such a Manner, as that it shall not be shaken again for some Ages. This all the World is sensible of abroad; this we have echo'd to us from all the Quarters of *Europe*. Of this *France* herself expresses the utmost Apprehensions, and the only People who either dislike or deride it, are a dis-

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contented Party at home, whom no Men, no Measures, can please; and whom, since nothing can satisfy, it seems to be a vain thing to study any longer giving them Satisfaction.

In order to clear up this Point to rational and well-meaning People, we need only consider what were the favourite Topicks of such as declared themselves dissatisfied before the Removal of the late Minister. Were they not his want of Concern for the Honour of the Nation abroad, his neglecting our natural Allies, and suffering the Power of the House of *Bourbon* to become daily more and more formidable? On the other hand, did the Friends of that Minister admit the Facts mentioned in this Charge, and then undertake to justify him in what he had done? No, they did not, whatever some, who call themselves his Friends, may do now. They knew, that admitting such a Charge would have lost him the whole Whig-Interest, which has unanimously and uniformly contended for the opposite Measures; I mean, for our being constantly as the Head of the Protestant and independent Interest in *Europe*, for supporting the House of *Austria*, and the Freedom of *Germany*, and for opposing at all Times, and in all Places, the Increase of *French* Power, and the Progress of *French* Influence. This being so, who could have expected to hear the present Ministry, in so small a Compass of time, treated with such high Disrespect, and even threatned with Impeachments for prosecuting what the Nation told them was its own Interest, and for carrying on more vigorously that Scheme, which the best Friends of the late Minister said (and I believe truly) he had laid down,

for granting further Supplies to the Queen of *Hungary*, for continuing to support the King of *Sardinia*, and for putting ourselves in such a Posture on the Continent, as to be able to act, when Action shall become most necessary? If Impeachments at *Westminster*, like the Gibbets and Fires at *West-Smithfield* in former Times, are to be the Doom of Statesmen of both Parties, what Road shall the publick Servants of this Nation take to be safe? Or if the People, like a Weather-cock, are to be thus blown about by the Breath of Calumny and Clamour, how shall any Pilot pretend to steer the Ship of this Commonwealth?

Another Train of Objections has been indeed set up, as it is natural for Men to object every thing against the Conduct of those they are determined to oppose. These Objections suppose, that the Malecontents are the best Friends to the House of *Austria*; and that all they are concerned about is, whether she has really had the Money voted her, whether we have been in earnest in serving her, whether our Troops in *Flanders* have been of any Use to her, or no; and in those, whether, after taking six Millions of our Money for their Support, the present Ministry have not put the greatest Part of it in their own Pockets, and left the Queen of *Hungary* and the Balance of *Europe* in the Lurch. To shape Answers to those Queries, certainly requires no great Penetration: We need only attend to what these People say, and what the Ministry have done, and the Mist will be dissolved, and the Prospect become clear at once. The Supplies granted to the Queen of *Hungary* could be no Secret to her, when they were made known to all the World: And in as much as she has publickly

Illickly acknowledged the kind and constant Assistance of *Great Britain*, as she declares her Dependance upon it, in her Speech to the States of *Lower Austria*, to doubt her receiving these Supplies, argues a large Stock of Malice, as well as very little Faith. The sending of our Troops to *Flanders* is thus accounted for, together with its Consequences, by his Majesty in his Speech. "I have, "says he, in pursuance of the repeated Advice of "my Parliament, taken such a Part as appear'd to "me most conducive to the Support of the House "of *Austria*, and to the restoring and securing of "the Balance of Power. In this View I ordered "a considerable Body of Troops to be sent from "hence into *Flanders*; and, at the Close of the "last Session, I foresaw and pointed out to you, "that it might be incumbent upon me, to enter "into further Measures for the same great and de-"sirable Ends. The Augmentation of our Strength "in the Low Countries, became a necessary Step; "for which Purpose I sent, in concert with my "Allies, fifteen thousand of my Electoral Troops "thither, with the *Hessians* in the *British* Pay, in "order to form such a Force, in conjunction with "the *Austrian* Troops, as might be of Service to "the common Cause in all Events; and I doubt "not but I shall have your Assistance in the Sup-"port of these necessary Measures." I have cited this as a plain Narration of Facts, which doubtless will be justified where they must be examined. If we have put ourselves to much Trouble, it is plain we have put *France* to no less; we need only look on her Edicts for recruiting the Militia, and consider with what View they are published, to be

convinced that the Measures taken to distress her have not been ineffectual. And if we recal to our Remembrance the Ruin of their veteran Armies in *Germany*, to which they will scarce have it in their power to send Recruits, we must confess that something has been done towards reducing *France*. On the other hand, if we transported Troops, we could transport them no where so properly as into *Flanders*, the preserving of that Country being immediately the Concern of *Great Britain*, as much, perhaps, as it is of the Queen of *Hungary*; and that it has not been lost, or even invaded, is a good Account of the Employment of these Troops, unless, after what passed in *Germany*, our Patriots would have been for trusting the *bona fides* of *France* in the Low Countries. Why these Troops have been increased, while in that Part of the World, by an Accession of Forces in *British* Pay, is accounted for in the foregoing Paragraph, wherein his Majesty tells us, that it was concerted with his Allies; And though, as a free People, we may take the Liberty now and then of supposing, that our Ministry may mistake or neglect the Interest of our Allies; yet sure we must give them leave to understand their own, and in consequence of this ought to be satisfied, that if these Troops could have been employed more for their Service elsewhere, they would not have concerted with us this Measure of keeping them here.

We come now to the last and great Question, The Expediency of taking *Hanoverian* Troops into our Pay, which has occasioned so great Clamour, and has induced some People to suggest, that it is Foundation enough even for a Rebelli-

on,

en. But, previous to this, it will be neceſſary for me to ſay ſomething in reference to the Electorate of *Hanover*, and the King's Subjects there, independent of the preſent Conſideration.

As it is extremely juſt and reaſonable for us to expect, that the Concerns of theſe Kingdoms ſhould no way ſuffer on account of the King's Dominions in *Germany*, and as it was very fit this ſhould be provided for in the Act of Settlement; ſo, on the other hand, it is as natural to conceive, that, in a Country like ours, which is always divided by Factions, and where it is notoriouſly known, that this very Settlement was oppoſed by a very great Party, nay, carried but by a ſingle Voice: I ſay, it is natural to conceive, that, in ſuch a Country, a Spirit of Rancour will reign, and a thouſand Surmiſes be perpetually riſing in the Minds of diſcontented People in relation to theſe foreign Territories, even ſuppoſing the Prince upon the Throne to act, in reſpect to them, with the greateſt Reſtitude and Caution. It was ſo in our ancient Government, when our Princes had Dominions in *France*: And, the ſame Notions reigned after the Union of the two Kingdoms which compoſed this Iſland. Nay, to ſuch a Pitch has *Engliſh* Jealouſy ſometimes riſen, that it is recorded of as great and wiſe a Miniſter as ever this Nation had, that he wiſhed *Ireland* under Water, provided the Inhabitants were ſafe. I mention none of theſe as Caſes any way parallel, further than in their manifeſting the Extravagancy of our Spirit, and that we are extremely capable of flying out into the moſt unjuſtifiable Exceſſes, upon none, or at leaſt upon very ſlight Grounds.

We ought therefore, upon all ſuch Occaſions as theſe, to watch over this reſtleſs Diſpoſition, and not ſuffer it to tranſport us too far before we enquire into the Reaſon of Things, and the true Motives of thoſe Tranſactions, at which we find ourſelves apt to take Fire.

According to the ſame Rule, by which it becomes fit that the Elector of *Hanover* ſhould not meet with any Partiality in one Senſe from the King of *Great Britain*, the Subjects of the Electorate of *Hanover* ought not to ſuffer on the other, in any Relation wherein they may ſtand to *Great Britain*, on account of both Countries having the ſame Sovereign. The Act of Settlement provides wiſely, that *Hanover* ſhould not be the Cauſe of *Great Britain*'s ſuffering; but it would have been equally cruel and unjuſt, if, by any Clauſe in that Act of Parliament, it had been provided that the Elector of *Hanover* ſhould be in a worſe State than he was before, or that we ſhould have leſs Regard for him as Elector of *Hanover*, than before he became King of *Great Britain*. This Nation hath ſince, as well as it had before, a certain Relation to, and Connection with the Proteſtant States of *Germany*; and as *Hanover* is one of theſe, we muſt have ſome Intercourſe with her, and, in the Nature of things, our true Intereſts in *Germany* muſt have been, and ſtill are the ſame. This, inſtead of being, as it ought to have been, a great Advantage to *Hanover*, has been in reality a Loſs to her; for whenever our Princes have acted, as according to this Maxim, they ought to act, the Enemies of their Family have not failed to give out, that they have ſacrificed the Intereſts of this

Country

Country to that; whereas, in Truth, they have ſerved both, and been partial to neither.

Of this, many Inſtances may be given; but I will be content to ſpeak in this Place only of one, and that ſhall be the Caſe now under Conſideration. The Elector of *Hanover*, upon the Demiſe of the late Emperor, might no doubt have made as good Terms with reſpect to his private Intereſt as any of the reſt of the Electors; and that he did not do ſo, could be owing to no other Motives, than Regard to Treaties, Reſpect for the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and Concern for the true Intereſt of *Germany*. For a Prince acting in this manner, and ſtaking as it were his whole Dominions in ſuch a Cauſe, would *Great Britain* have had no Regard, when at the ſame Time ſhe was bound in Intereſt to make this Cauſe her own? Or if, in ſuch a Caſe, ſhe would and ought to have afforded him her Aſſiſtance, is ſhe releas'd from all Obligation in that reſpect, becauſe it happens that the Elector of *Hanover*, who acts thus, is alſo King of *Great Britain*? Does this any way affect the Rectitude of his Meaſures in that Character? Or, ought we to be angry with ſuch a Conduct in our Sovereign, as we ſhould have applauded in a foreign Prince? Yet this is certainly the thing, and, ſtript of all Diſguiſes, the Matter of Fact is no other than as it has been ſtated by me. The Electorate of *Hanover* has been in danger by the Conformity of its Elector's Proceedings with thoſe of the King of *Great Britain*; and if it was ſecured by a Neutrality with *France*, it was not till that became a Meaſure of Neceſſity; and this was no way at the Expence of *Great Britain*. On the other hand, as

to the Vote of the Elector in favour of the Emperor, it might be given him on another Motive, than ſetting up the Creature of *France*; and there are many Reaſons to conceive it was given him upon another Motive: To believe the contrary therefore, is to believe what never has been or can be proved, and to believe it on the Credit of ſuch People as we know would aſſert it, if they knew it to be a Falſhood.

But it may be, indeed it has been often and loudly objected, that *Britiſh* Miniſters propoſed an Alliance between the Elector of *Hanover* and the States General, which, with ſome, amounts to a full Proof, that the Intereſts of theſe Kingdoms have been ſacrificed to thoſe of that Electorate. That ſuch a Step ſhould ever be taken by any *Britiſh* Miniſters, will appear very improbable to any reaſonable Man, who reflects but for a Moment: But that the two noble Lords, diſhonoured by this Calumny, ſhould ever be guilty of ſo ſilly, as well as flagrant a Treaſon againſt their Country, is what no Mortal, who knows their Characters, but muſt diſbelieve as ſoon as he hears it. In the whole Dominions of *Britain*, I dare ſay, it would be very difficult, as corrupt a People as we are ſaid to be, to fix on two Men of any Figure who would engage in ſuch a ſhameful Action; and, on the other hand, I think it would be very hard to name two Perſons more unlikely than the two who have been named, even ſuppoſing us as corrupt as ſome of our Countrymen (who, to be ſure, know themſelves beſt) would repreſent us. But as I ſaid before, this Meaſure may be eaſily accounted for. The Elector of *Hanover* was in immediate Dan-

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ger from the Influence of foreign Power in the Empire; and therefore it was very natural for him to have deſired ſuch an Alliance for removing that Influence, and for ſecuring the Independency of the *Germanick* Body, a Point of very high Importance to the Maritime Powers. If therefore the States had entred into this Alliance, and had furniſhed a certain Quota of Troops, I cannot help thinking, that it would have been one of the propereſt Methods, if not the propereſt Method for ſecuring this great Point, without our becoming a Principal in any War that it might have occaſioned. At leaſt thus much is plain, that it would have rendred thoſe Steps unneceſſary, which have been ſince ſo vehemently complained of, by raiſing immediately ſuch a Force as was requiſite for attaining that Purpoſe, which we have been now forced to compaſs another Way.

The very ſame People who have expreſſed themſelves with ſuch Warmth againſt this Scheme of uſing the Elector of *Hanover*'s Name, for providing a Force ſufficient to anſwer this ſalutary End of ſuccouring the Queen of *Hungary*, and protecting the Freedom of *Germany*, are at other Times, diſpoſed to ſhew no leſs Reſentment, on a Suppoſition, that the Elector of *Hanover* has not exerted himſelf effectually in defence of her *Hungarian* Majeſty. This is ſufficient to prove, that they are not in reality diſſatisfied with any Meaſure from a Conviction of its being wrong in itſelf, but that reſolving to find Fault with, and oppoſe every Meaſure that is or can be taken, they are obliged to have Recourſe to different Principles, that they may be able to raiſe ſome co-

lourable Objections againſt what is done, and at the ſame time to ſuggeſt plauſible Reaſons in favour of whatever is not done. So that while *France* carries all her Deſigns into Execution under the Name of an auxiliary Power, we are driven from that, and indeed from any other Expedient of that Nature, by its being made criminal for our Miniſters ſo much as to attempt them, and at the ſame time even different Parties concur in repreſenting it as a notorious Error in Politicks, for us to have Recourſe to the only Method that is left of *Great-Britain*'s acting directly and openly, in a Cauſe which ſo nearly concerns her both in point of Honour and Intereſt; and to ſerve ſuch wayward Purpoſes, as theſe, a Step which was held juſt and honourable in the Reign of a Daughter of the late King *James*, I mean the taking *Hanoverian* Troops into *Britiſh* Pay, which was conſtantly done during the laſt general War, is made a Crime of the deepeſt Dye in the Adminiſtration of his preſent Majeſty. To do this more effectually, the utmoſt Pains has been taken to poſſeſs the Nation, that this is a direct Infringement of the Act of Settlement, which is equally repugnant to Juſtice and to Truth; for tho' the Act of Settlement does indeed provide, that the King ſhall not expoſe his *Britiſh* Dominions to protect thoſe he poſſeſſes in *Germany*, yet I defy the ableſt of theſe Politicians to point out the Clauſe in that Act, which reſtrains his preſent Majeſty, or any Prince of his Houſe, from ſtaking his Electorate in the common Cauſe of Publick Liberty, or even in the Cauſe of *Great-Britain*.

From this Diſpoſition of finding Fault with ev-

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ry thing, and a ſettled Reſolution of never allowing the Meaſures of any Miniſtry to be right, proceed many other groundleſs Reflections that have been lately ſcattered among the People, merely to diſturb and diſtract their Minds at this critical Juncture. Amongſt theſe I reckon that ſtrange Inſinuation, that we are fighting now only for the Sound of the Houſe of *Auſtria*; whereas nothing can be plainer, than that we aim at preventing the Houſe of *Auſtria* from becoming a Sound, by preſerving to the Heireſs of that Houſe the Dominions of her Anceſtors, to which we are bound by Treaties and by Intereſt. But then at the ſame time we are endeavouring to ſupport the Liberty and Independency of *Germany*, and to ſecure a proper Balance againſt *France*, by bringing back all the Princes of *Germany*, without Exception, to a juſt Senſe of their own Intereſt, and of the Importance of preſerving the Dominions of the Houſe of *Auſtria* intire, that it may the more effectually contribute to that Balance. When therefore the thing is conſidered in this Light, we can neither look upon it as an ill-adjuſted or impracticable Scheme, eſpecially when we remember the great Advances that have been made towards it, and compare the preſent State of things in the Empire with the State in which they were leſs than a Year ago.

This is that Reduction of *France*, which is ſought by the preſent Adminiſtration, and which they will certainly bring about, if thoſe who have hitherto daſhed all Deſigns for curbing that ambitious Power do not acquire Strength enough to fruſtrate this alſo. We need not fright ourſelves

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with the Remembrance of what extraordinary Efforts *France* made in the laſt War, when we ſee to how little purpoſe the great Efforts have been, which ſhe has made in this. If our Miniſtry had in view the taking from the Houſe of *Bourbon*, *Spain* and the *Indies*, or any thing equivalent thereto, theſe Objections might be proper enough; but, as it is, they are quite wide of the Point: The thing now in queſtion betwixt *France* and us is ſimply this, Whether ſhe ſhall carry her Scheme of enſlaving *Germany* into Execution, under colour of ſupporting the Emperor's Pretenſions to the Succeſſion of the Houſe of *Auſtria*; or whether we, in maintenance of our Treaties, and in ſupport of our manifeſt Intereſt, ſhall endeavour to preſerve to the Heireſs of the Houſe of *Auſtria* her hereditary Countries, and aſſiſt the Princes of the Empire, who are now convinced of their Errors, to expel the Armies of *France*, as they have ſhaken off her Influence, and reſtore the Empire and its Head, if he will conſider himſelf in that Capacity, and not as a Creature of *France*, to the Figure they ought to make in *Europe*? This, as far as can be collected from all our publick Acts, is the great Scheme which we have embraced; and what there is in this unworthy of being avowed, or which, if united amongſt ourſelves, is beyond our Force to accompliſh, after all the learned Writings of our angry Politicians, we are yet to learn.

We value ourſelves much on our Freedom of Thought, and on the Freedom of our Preſs; both of which, I dare ſay, are in as little Danger under this, as ever they were under any Adminiſtration; and therefore, I think, never any Miniſtry had a better Title to the Uſe of both. Yet theſe, I dare

ſay,

ſay, are all the Force they will ever need to defend them againſt the ableſt and moſt inveterate of their Enemies. If we will but diſpoſe ourſelves to hear patiently what can be ſaid in ſupport of their Meaſures, even by ſuch as are not favoured by any Lights from them, but write purely from the Dictates of Reaſon and Experience, and from the Knowledge they have of what paſſes in the World in common with the reſt of Mankind; I dare ſay, we ſhall be in no danger of ſinking either into Slavery or Deſpair. But if it ſhall be ever thought criminal to animate the People of *Great Britain* to imitate their Anceſtors, to aſſert their Right of holding the Balance of Power, and ſet themſelves at the Head of ſuch States as are for maintaining the Independency of *Europe*, we may ſoon run back to that low State in which we were, when this Spirit was treated as *Don Quixotiſm*, and have nothing elſe to do but to harraſs and deſtroy each other with Diſputes about Forms of Government, which are equally fruitleſs and endleſs, and ſerve only to ſubject the honeſt, the induſtrious and well-meaning, to the ſelf-intereſted Views of cunning and ambitious Men. The Way to be eaſy at home, is to have nothing to fear from abroad; and when the Peace of *Europe* is once ſolidly ſettled, it is moſt likely that we ſhould have it in our Power to reſtore whatever Parts of our Conſtitution, Length of Time, or Party-Rage, may have hurt; to leſſen the Load of publick Debt, and to free us from the Taxes which oppreſs us; and to the impoſing both of which, nothing contributed more than the oppoſing the juſt Deſigns of thoſe who governed us in former Times.

FINIS.

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